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Financial resilience of English local government in the aftermath of COVID-19 
 
 
Structured abstract  
 
Purpose: The financial resilience of local authorities has been a serious concern over the past 
decade due to austerity and its effects on local government budgets despite rising service 
demands. More recently, the scale and suddenness of the shock from COVID-19 has 
exacerbated problems of financial resilience. This paper explores the financial management 
responses required by a sudden, nationwide pandemic of such severity.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: This paper applies the concept of financial resilience to 
English local government to analyse their situation in the aftermath of COVID-19. It is based 
on a close reading of official reports and the news media. 
 
Findings: Local authority financial resilience could deal with normal levels of risk arising 
from austerity. However, the seriousness of COVID-19 alongside pressures still emanating 
from Brexit requires a significant level of central government support. This is critical as local 
government is expected to underpin future economic growth of the UK as well as deliver an 
important social response. Presently, the financial framework for funding individual local 
authorities through central government in terms of COVID-19 support is not on a reliable 
footing to answer specific demands. This can lead to gaming and perverse incentives.  
 
Originality/value: This is the first paper to connect the financial resilience in the local 
government framework with the required central government funding procedures for sudden 
nationwide crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. It identifies the need to define what 
effect key variables, such as local government financial reserves, local deprivation indices, 
and anticipatory financial management practices in local government should have on the 
determination of central government aid for individual local authorities. 
 







Since the financial crisis in 2008 and subsequent decade of the Conservative-led central 
government’s austerity-localism policy, the financial resilience of local authorities in England 
has been a serious concern (Ahrens and Ferry, 2015; Jones, 2017). This has been further 
exacerbated due to uncertainties arising from Brexit and concerns over climate change 
(Travers, 2016). More recently, COVID-19 has shaken the foundations of government 
financial planning and intensified problems of financial resilience at all governmental levels, 
but in particular the local level where the capacity and capability to absorb and adapt is more 
limited (Marrs, 2020a). This paper explores financial resilience of English local government 
in the aftermath of COVID-19. 
 
Whereas extant research into the financial resilience of local government has been conducted 
against the background of austerity, which focused on gradual adaptive processes and 
evolving financial management capabilities (Barbera et al., 2016, 2017, 2019; Papenfuß et al., 
2017; Steccolini et al., 2017), this paper explores the concept of financial resilience in local 
government in the context of the sudden nationwide COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic 
requires a significant level of central government support, at least as an interim measure. 
Otherwise a collapse in local government would not only weaken any social response in the 
aftermath of COVID-19, but could also damage a central institution required for 
strengthening economic growth (Travers, 2012). 
 
In the short term, local government support is coming from emergency budget allocations 
(Office for Budget Responsibility, 2020). However, as the true extent and implications of 
COVID-19 are better understood it becomes ever more critical that a formalised spending 
review is undertaken to provide a framework for political priorities, policies and funding 
mechanisms. In this way the spending review can take place as a framework for the annual 
budgets, with appropriate audit and accountability arrangements to look at not only the cost 
but the value for money and equity from decisions (ibid.). Risk management practices can 
also take place against such a framework not only for local government itself, but the 
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) and more broadly 
across Whitehall departments that support local government activities (Davies, 2020). 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the literature around 
resilience, crisis, and accounting, and its implications for English local government in the 
aftermath of COVID-19. Section 3 sets out the methodology. Section 4 presents findings on 
the UK government response to COVID-19. Section 5 discusses the theoretical contribution 
and implications for policy, practice and future research. 
 
2. Resilience, crisis, and accounting 
 
Local government financial resilience has been the subject of a growing body of academic 
research that has focused on financial conformance and overall financial sustainability of 
local government, but largely ignored service performance (Christian and Bush, 2018; Ferry 
and Eckersley, 2015; Sacco and Busheé, 2013). A series of comparative studies that drew on 
observations from Germany, Italy, and the UK showed that local governments react 
differently to constraints and stimuli (Barbera et al., 2017, 2019, 2020). These differences 
were traced to inherent variations that were related to specific histories of resourcing and 
financial management. ‘Bouncing back’ strategies, included for example taxes and fees 
increases, deferred investments, costs reductions, organisational resizing, and asset sales. 
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‘Bouncing forward’ strategies fed on—but also sought to improve—anticipatory capabilities. 
They emphasised self-sufficiency, innovation, entrepreneurship, redefinitions of core 
activities and service delivery modes, improved and new services, and new clients. They 
required, for example, information exchange and sharing, monitoring systems, critical 
thinking approaches, organisational cultures of adaptation, and rapidity of action, but also 
perceived control over sources of financial vulnerability in relation to financial autonomy, 
abundance of financial resources, and low level of indebtedness and low volatility of own 
revenue resources. Thus, higher financial vulnerability was associated with bouncing back 
strategies, whereas bouncing forward strategies were associated with stronger anticipatory 
capacities. 
 
There has been some field research evidence of good anticipatory capabilities in English local 
authorities (Barbera et al., 2019; Thomasson et al., 2020). Key to this are practices involving 
both central and local government, such as the spending review, budget, accountability and 
audit, and risk management arrangements (Ferry et al., 2015; Ferry and Eckersley, 2019) as 
well as accountability relationships between local authorities and citizens (Ahrens et al., 
2020; Ahrens and Ferry, 2015; Ferry et al., 2019). Maintaining such capacities over the long 
term would be important in light of expectations of enduring difficulties in funding public 
services, not least in the context of discontinued European infrastructure investment 
following Brexit (Travers, 2016). Some municipalities are attempting to become more 
entrepreneurial in response to budget cuts by focusing on the strategic domains of boundary 
and belief systems (Ferry et al., 2017) and corporatisation of services (Andrews et al., 2020).  
 
We would suggest, however, that the challenges arising from an urgent nationwide crisis such 
as COVID-19 put different strains on government than the ‘slow burn’ of austerity. The 
academic discussion has frequently focused on the effects of austerity on sustainability in the 
public sector (Grossi and Cepiku, 2014). The roles of accounting in urgent crises of 
government has, thus far, been mainly explored in relation to natural and environmental 
disasters (Boin et al., 2016; Lai et al., 2014; Newberry, 2020; Sargiacomo, 2015). Moreover, 
the problems of governments’ risk policies and practices have attracted some interest in the 
public administration literature, for example in the UK context (Gerodimos, 2004; Rothstein 
and Downer, 2012).  
 
The UK government had considered the risks of pandemics in planning documents from 2005 
to 2018 (Lambert, 2020). They suggest that the UK had prepared to ‘mitigate’ rather than 
‘suppress’ a virus outbreak, with deaths of between 210,000 and 315,000 people as a 
plausible planning outcome under a worst-case scenario. Strict social distancing enforced by 
the UK did not underpin any planning documents, nor did technological tracking, as 
employed in Singapore, or mass testing on the scale of South Korea. This was the playbook 
the UK government followed throughout February and into early March 2020, expecting that 
the outbreak would soon be over, albeit with significant deaths. This plan was reversed with 
the UK economy, government finances and freedom of movement sacrificed to avoid the 
potential mortality rate that the initial approach accepted. The crisis would seem illustrative 
of the notion of government as ‘congenitally failing’ (Miller and Rose, 1990), both in terms 
of its planning and in the use of its plans when faced with the actual emergency. 
 
The unprecedented nature of this global pandemic in contemporary times has led to greater 
interest in the specific problems that pandemics may pose for the uses of accounting by the 
state, by researchers or government finance practitioners. ‘[A]ccording to international 
finance expert Allen Schick, […] ‘no country has ever set aside sufficient fiscal reserves to 
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finance major wars, economic depressions or biological pandemics […] In fact, few countries 
have sufficient reserves to cover shortfalls owing to cyclical recessions’’ (Marrs, 2020b). 
This includes even better-prepared countries, those that are likely to maintain fiscal balance 
during growth cycles, cover costs of pensions and healthcare, and monitor sustainability of 
government budgets and policies. Public sector audit, too, fails to scrutinise government 
readiness for urgent crises concerning low probability, high impact events (Comptroller and 
Auditor General, 2019). Having said that, there is evidence some unconventional mechanisms 
to support governments through the Great Recessions have been employed in response to the 
pandemic, such as the reinstatement of swap lines from the USA Federal Reserve to major 
economies (Tooze, 2020). 
 
A key difficulty lies in the unavailability of relevant statistics. Whilst the UK public sector is 
often credited with an ability to manage daily risks through effective scenario planning as 
well as medium term financial planning and risk management, during the decade of austerity 
the collection of much statistical information that would be required for mitigating risk 
during an urgent crisis has no longer been collected and analysed (Marrs, 2020b). Moreover, 
central government departments such as the MHCLG do not have clear oversight of what 
statistics are still available. Planning may well not be up to the challenge of managing key 
elements of financial and service resilience, such as reserves, insurance, or cash flow from 
debt covenants. At the national level, it is critical that there is an appropriate response from 
national institutions including government in terms of the planning, budgeting, audit and risk 
management mechanisms with informed central-local government relations (Ferry and 
Eckersley, 2015, 2019, 2020; Ferry 2019). 
 
3. Research approach and methods  
 
The starting point for our paper was a concern over a potential neglect of key financial 
oversight practices during the fast-unfolding COVID-19 crisis. Clearly, the speed with which 
the UK population was infected and death rate surprised the government, as evidenced by 
quick changes of strategy and an overall lack of preparedness of the public health services to 
execute a coordinated response to the crisis.  
  
We consider the UK central government and English local government response to COVID-
19 from March to July 2020 with regards to the impacts and implications for financial 
resilience. The 365 local authorities are a main conduit for public expenditure in England, 
with a net revenue budget of over £95bn for 2018/19, which is over 20% of total public 
service spend. The impact of local government is highly significant on other public services 
(such as education, NHS, police, and fire services due to joint work), and on the private 
sector due to the effect on local communities and the extent of public service delivery and 
commissioning involving private sector partners. Therefore the accountability of local 
authority finances is of high significance for social value in terms of the social, economic and 
environmental well-being of citizens across England. 
 
In terms of research methods, one of the authors attended the Chancellor’s budget speech at 
Parliament on 11th March 2020 that considered responses toward prosperity to end austerity 
and to manage the threat posed by COVID-19. Since then additional allocations over and 
above the original budget for COVID-19 have increased exponentially, well beyond what 
was anticipated. To keep track of these budget changes the authors have reviewed subsequent 
documentation including official reports, online Parliamentary committee sessions, and news 
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media during COVID-19 up to the 20th July 2020, and participated in expert conversations 




Resilience during austerity 
There have been concerns over the past decade around the funding resilience of English local 
government. For example, local authorities in England already had serious financial concerns 
after a decade of austerity combined with uncertainties around Brexit and additional costs to 
mitigate climate change issues. Indeed one of the researchers observed during his posting as a 
Parliamentary Fellow and then Adviser from 2018 to 2020 that many social movement 
protests related to such issues.  
 
From a revenue perspective, the finance system for local government has been subject to 
many calls for comprehensive reform (Governing England: Devolution and Funding, 2018). 
This has included grants from central government which have greatly reduced as part of 
austerity-localism policy (Sandford, 2016). The two main local sources of funding have also 
remained largely stagnant. This is despite a call to change the national non-domestic rates 
system so local authorities retain more of the business rates raised locally rather than having 
equalisation in distribution, and recognition that council tax on domestic property is based on 
outdated property valuations and is not a strong link between funding raised locally and local 
democracy (Governing England: Devolution and Funding, 2018). 
 
Various proposals for new sources of revenue funding have been suggested. They include 
more control of council tax, property valuations and a premium for empty homes, and 
business rates, as well as a range of transport taxes, local income taxes, and tourism tax. 
There have also been suggestions around capital and revenue funding through bid based 
grants. Other suggestions have included capital proposals such as asset sales, and capital 
financing of borrowing, e.g., via the public works loans board. Overall, these do not make up 
for lost funds, however. 
 
Regarding expenditure, demand and need have both increased from citizens but budget 
cutbacks to balance the books have led to staff reductions that have decreased available 
capacity to deliver. In particular, many discretionary services have been seriously depleted if 
not stopped and even mainstream statutory services such as child and adult social care have 
been particularly highlighted for concern (Oral Evidence Presented to the Housing, 
Communities and Local Government Select Committee of the House of Commons Relating to 
Local Government Finance and the Spending Review 2019, 2019).  
 
COVID-19 
The onset of COVID-19 since March 2020 has greatly exacerbated these concerns around 
financial resilience of English local government. COVID-19 is unlike the shock from 
austerity. Austerity came with a forewarning so local authorities could prepare and 
implement cuts over a period through consultation, prioritisation and exploration of 
alternative delivery options (Ahrens and Ferry, 2015). Yet these changes weakened the 
capacity and capability of local government, and its ability to absorb future shocks and adapt. 
By contrast, COVID-19 is much more immediate in its impact and implications and gives 




In March 2020, the UK government mobilised a wide ranging response to COVID-19 across 
five areas (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2020). They were health and social care 
responses (including service delivery, equipment, testing, and vaccine development), various 
public services and emergency responses, support for individuals who were affected by the 
pandemic (including benefits and direct support to households), support for businesses, and 
other support (including international aid). By mid-May 2020 the total commitment was 
£124.3 billion, of which around £50 billion went on payments to employees on furlough and 
around £30 billion on other support for businesses (ibid., p. 6).  
 
By late June, around 150 local authorities in the UK forecast a combined budget shortfall of 
£3.2 billion as a consequence of various COVID-19 related effects, such as payments to 
families with reduced incomes, council tax holidays, lost business rates, lost leisure centre 
income, and drop in tourism related income (BBC News, 2020). The impact on individual 
councils varied considerably (“Formal meeting (oral evidence session): Public services: 
lessons from coronavirus”, 2020). Local lockdowns, such as in Leicester, may make such 
differential impacts even greater as the crisis continues. At least five English councils warned 
that without more government support they may meet the criteria to issue a section 114 
notice, declaring that they cannot achieve a balanced budget, i.e., spend exceeds resource. 
Ogden and Phillips (2020a) in a briefing note for the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) likewise 
underlined local variations in the financial risk and resilience of English local authorities 
arising from the COVID-19 crisis.1  
 
Whilst the government provided £3.2 billion of emergency grant funding and over £5 billion 
of cash flow to support local authorities in March and April 2020, there were concerns over 
the basis on which allocations to different local authorities were made. The allocation of most 
of the first tranche of £1.6 billion sought to address adult social care spending needs. The 
second £1.6 billion tranche was allocated on a per-person basis, going mostly to lower-tier 
shire districts, even though upper-tier counties have responsibility for social care services. 
This was to address concerns that the crisis would affect income more than spending, 
especially in urban authorities in the Midlands and North England. Additional issues are that 
lower-tier shire district councils rely more on business rates and sales, fees and charges 
income, exposing them to more revenue risk. Local authorities with more deprived 
communities are expected to face less revenue risk than affluent ones, but their residents may 
be more susceptible to COVID-19, potentially increasing demands on services. The ability to 
cope with increased borrowing is also expected to vary considerably. Many local authorities 
relying on revenues looking vulnerable in the short term have higher reserves, but not all of 
them. Overall, we notice significant regional imbalances in funding and capital investment 
for the public sector, creating vast differences in the ability of different local authorities to 
meet any crisis (Prowle and Latham, 2020). A similar point is also made by the large 
discrepancies in the expected funding shortfalls between different local authorities (BBC 
News, 2020).  
 
The local authority with the largest deficit was Birmingham City council with a forecast 
shortfall of £212 million across 2020-21 and 2021-22, even after receiving £70 million extra 
government funding. The severity of the situation was signalled by a temporary amendment 
                                                 
1 The IFS report was published alongside a spreadsheet dashboard (Ogden and Phillips, 2020b) that collates for 
each local authority in England a series of indicators of COVID-19 risks. It looks at the extent these risks vary, 
focusing on revenues and financial resilience. It also shows extra funding central government has made 




to section 114 suggested by CIPFA, whereby, in lieu of issuing a section 114 notice, ‘[a]t the 
earliest possible stage a CFO should make informal confidential contact with MHCLG to 
advise of financial concerns and a possible forthcoming S.114 requirement [, and] [t]he CFO 
should communicate the potential unbalanced budget position due to COVID-19 to MHCLG 
at the same time as providing a potential S.114 scenario report to the council executive 
(cabinet) and the external auditor’ (“CIPFA proposes amendments to S.114 guidelines”, 
2020). 
Marrs (2020a) on July 2nd estimated that local authorities overall had a £9.1bn total pressure 
with estimated cost pressures of £3.6bn for the current year plus losses from fees and 
commercial income and taxes of £5.5bn, with only £3.2bn having so far been offset by 
government grants. Table 1 summarises the potential impact on council finances for financial 
resilience arising from COVID-19. 
Table 1 - Projected impact on council finances from COVID-19 
Cost pressures £3.6bn 
Lost tax income and non-tax income losses £5.5bn 
Total financial challenges before grants £9.1bn 
Total grants (emergency funding in 2 tranches) £3.2bn 
Total shortfall £5.9bn 
 
A key question in the discussions over funding and funding gaps, however, is the availability 
of reliable statistics and financial measurements. Notably, the full dataset of local government 
financial information, on which the BBC reporting is based, does not disclose the financial 
reserves of the local councils.2 Recent reports suggest a heightened scrutiny of local 
management of financial reserves (Rudgewick, 2020a). Whilst many councils will need to 
draw on reserves, for some the management of the impact of COVID-19 will require that they 
even reduce reserves that had been earmarked for specific purposes (Marrs, 2020a). Also, 
whereas councils claim that the central government aid of £3.2 bn was insufficient, England’s 
Minister for Local Government said that this money was part of ‘a wider package of support 
from across government for local communities and businesses – totalling over £27 billion’ 
(BBC News, 2020). It is in this context of fast-changing information that new funding 
commitments, such as the 3rd tranche of emergency grant funding for local government of 
£500m the MHCLG announced on 2 July 20203, and the counter claims of local government 
representatives that this amount was wholly insufficient, need to be understood (Rudgewick, 
2020b): ‘Earlier this week, the Local Government Association predicted that additional costs 
[as] a result of Covid-19 could reach £10.9bn this year’ (ibid.).  
 
                                                 
2 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Pw1AKQ5-
KOLu_HAbKfSQPvDPCyuNN4J5ra_aX8HQ8cM/edit#gid=375033781 
3 The extra £0.5bn was funded through a 3rd tranche bringing the total emergency grant funding for local 
government to £3.7bn. The summer statement by Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) ‘Plan for Jobs’ 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file 
/898422/A_Plan_for_Jobs__Print_.pdf highlights a higher figure of £4.7bn approved funding to local 
government. However, it is important to note, the extra £1bn is not emergency grant funding but specific 
ringfenced funding to be passed direct to providers and includes £600 million additional funding to support 




COVID-19 has magnified the importance of local government. A longer term solution would 
depend on investments in crisis prevention (Evaluating Preventative Investments in Public 
Health in England, 2019), that considers virus suppression as well as mitigation (Lambert, 
2020), and also the ability to put local government financial planning and reporting on a more 




The paper considered the financial resilience of English local government during COVID-19. 
Whereas prior research has addressed financial resilience emanating from shocks such as 
financial crises and subsequent austerity policies at both the central and local government 
levels, we discuss financial resilience to shocks that have an immediate and significant 
nationwide impact that goes well beyond normal operational planning. As has been observed 
by commentators such as Schick it would be very difficult to plan reserves at a local level to 
deal with large-scale disasters and, as Ferry highlighted, while future-proofing is crucial the 
pandemic illustrated limitations and ‘Your planning is likely to go awry in the fact of 
events… Something will happen that you can’t predict’ (Marrs, 2020b). Therefore, nationally 
and internationally coordinated government responses are called for. Financial resilience and 
contingency response planning therefore should be framed beyond the local level.  
 
Crucial to such efforts are data analytics that underpin this financial resilience. Unfortunately, 
relevant capabilities have been depleted in English local government and MHCLG due to 
austerity. In addition, the institutional capacity and capability to be able to absorb the fallout 
from such a shock and adapt services accordingly has also been reduced during austerity with 
various layers of management and services stripped away from local government. It is 
therefore important that any financial resilience models consider service resilience in terms of 
crisis absorption and adaption. Presently, the financial framework for funding individual local 
authorities through central government in terms of COVID-19 support is not on a reliable 
footing to answer specific demands. Funds are distributed haphazardly. For example there is 
no framework to take account for need, deprivation, local authority financial reserves and 
local demographics among other things. The government’s accounting technologies have not 
yet caught up with the shock to its crisis response programme (Miller and Rose, 1990). 
 
Policymakers need to consider how they can strengthen institutions and financial resilience 
ready for crises that need to be dealt with at a national level rather than just a local level, 
bearing in mind that national government must bail out local government during crisis-
induced short-term underfunding—at the right amount for each local authority (Travers, 
2020). According to the Permanent Secretary for the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy the scenario planning for pandemics focussed on health and was between 
Health and the Cabinet Office rather than focussing on the economy and local government 
issues (Public Accounts Committee, 2020). Policymakers also need to understand that the 
local government response will be crucial to the national effort to recover from COVID-19 as 
the local nature of a crisis requires local solutions (Johnson, 2020). Practitioners have to 
consider how funding can be employed in such responses towards financial resilience, 
especially regarding the different revenue and capital implications and how this feeds through 
to the income and expenditure account, cash flow statement and balance sheet for the future. 
In terms of future research, it is important that financial sustainability of governments at a 
local and national level is considered for England, the UK, and comparative international 
studies. Studies should also research how local governments have actually responded in terms 
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